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TOWARD A REFORM OF THE SIX-YEAR BAR TO
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUTPCY
Since early in this century, the six-year bar to discharge has been
a familiar feature of bankruptcy law: a debtor who has once been

adjudicated a bankrupt and granted a discharge has traditionally been

unable to obtain another discharge for six years afterwards. 1 The

continued vitality of the measure, originally applicable to all forms of
bankruptcy available, is now uncertain and controversial under the
new chapter proceedings. The confusion surrounding the six-year bar
suggests the need for a fresh consideration of the purposes of the rule.
This Note examines the bar's animating rationale and the status of
the bar under the current Bankruptcy Code; 2 it argues that Congress
should precisely define the policy goals behind the bar and revise the
measure to serve only those goals rather than a vague hostility toward
multiple discharge.
I.

HISTORICAL RATIONALES FOR THE SIX-YEAR BAR

Historically, there have been three principal understandings of the
bar's purpose. First, the bar's supporters have justified it as a means
of curbing fraudulent behavior. The bar's original sponsor, Congressman Ray of New York, argued that it would control "professional
bankrupts," men in the "great cities . . . who make it a business to
3
run in debt and then take advantage of the bankruptcy act."' Similarly, when Congress amended the measure in 1927 to direct that

discharge in involuntary as Well as voluntary proceedings should trigger the bar, proponents justified the change on the ground that many
of "the so-called involuntary proceedings are really instituted with the
'4
knowledge and at the behest of the debtor."
Second, the bar has been seen as merely a limit on discharge itself
a limit that implies no moral condemnation of the debtor. In Perry
1 As originally adopted in 19o3, the six-year bar provided that discharge in voluntary
proceedings would make another discharge unavailable for six years. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch.
487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797, 797-98. The provision was amended in 1926 to give a discharge in
involuntary proceedings the same effect. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 4o6, § 6, 44 Stat. 662, 66364. An amendment in 1938 stated that confirmation of a plan of composition in chapter XI or
XIII should also give rise to a bar. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § i, 52 Stat. 840, 850 (1938)
(repealed 1978). An amendment in 1952 made clear that the six-year period was to be reckoned
from the filing of the petition for bankruptcy in the earlier case to the filing in the second case.

Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 6, 66 Stat. 420, 422-23.

A final amendment in 1970 provided

that a finding of nondischargeability of a listed debt based solely on the six-year bar would not
have res judicata effect to bar discharge permanently. Act of Oct. i9, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-467, § 7, 84 Stat. 990, 992.

2 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151,326 (1982).
S35 CONG. REc. 6941 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Ray).
4 S. REP. No. 4o6, 69 th Cong., ist Sess. 5 (1926).
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v. Commerce Loan Co.,5 the most authoritative judicial explanation
to date of the bar's purpose, the Supreme Court insisted that the,
rationale for the measure was "the prevention of recurrent avoidance
of debts," 6 and noted in passing that "a prior bankruptcy is hardly a
'guilty' act within the usual meaning of that word."' 7 The legislative
history of the bar's amendment in 19708 echoes this assertion: the
Judiciary Committee report explained that, whereas most other
grounds for denying discharge involved "some form and degree of
dishonesty or lack of cooperation," the bar was "entirely distinct from
such type of activity." 9
A third perception of the purpose of the bar, never bluntly articulated or acknowledged, combines elements of the other two: the bar
is designed to limit repeated discharge regardless of particular circumstances, because seeking frequent discharge is itself a form of misconduct. According to this view, fraudulent behavior by persons requesting multiple discharge is but a particularly egregious instance of the
misconduct that inheres in all requests for repeated forgiveness. Thus,
a prior bankruptcy becomes misconduct if it is part of a pattern of
repeated discharge.
The first manifestation of this third view was Congressman Ray's
assertion that "it is quite clear that no person should have the benefit
of the act" too often. 1 0 The use of the word "benefit" is significant:
it reflects a notion that the bar limits discharge not to protect creditors
or the general economy, but to deny the social largesse to debtors who
beg mercy with undue frequency.
The majority in Perry expressed the same view. "The unmistakable purpose of the six-year provision," the Court wrote, "was to
prevent the creation of a class of habitual bankrupts - debtors who
might repeatedly escape their obligations as frequently as they chose
by going through repeated bankruptcy."" This view seems to have
been the standard judicial policy defense of the bar: language nearly
identical to that in Perry appeared in virtually all contemporaneous
cases construing the purpose of the provision.1 2 By using the specific
s 383 U.S. 392 (1966). The Court held that prior discharge did not bar later confirmation
of a plan that provided only for an extension of time for repayment, because no actual discharge
was involved.
6 Id. at 402.

7 Id. at 4oo. The dissent also acknowledged that a prior discharge is not "morally reprehensible." Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8 See supra note i.
9 H.R. REP. No. 1502, gist Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
10 35 CONG. REc. 6940 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Ray).
11383 U.S. at 399 (citing H.R. RElP. No. 1698, 57 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1902)).
12 See Turner v. Boston, 393 F.2d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 1968); Barnes v. Maley, 360 F.2d 922,
924 (7th Cir. 1966); In re Mayorga, 355 F.2d 89, 90 (9th Cir. 1966); In re Holmes, 309 F.2d
748, 748 (zoth Cir. 1962); In re Jensen, 2oo F.2d 58, 62 ( 7 th Cir.) (Lindley, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1952); In re Hardy, 287 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D. Ohio 1967); In re Mahaley,
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value-charged words "habit," "chose," and "escape," the Court suggested that repeating applicants suffer from a lack of self-discipline or
even that they are willfully irresponsible. When these words are read
together with the Court's simultaneous assertions that seeking a fresh
start is not itself reprehensible, the implications become clear: one
failure every six years is understandable, but any more than one is a
"free ride" that our system will not tolerate.
This third view has, over the years, been the central animus
underlying the six-year bar. The plight of the "honest but unfortunate" debtors who have been swept into the bar's wide nets has been
noted since floor debate on the provision in I9o2,13 but Congress has
never amended the measure to exempt such applicants. Despite judicial assertions that the bar's purpose is not punitive, 14 the bar does
function as a punishment, if' not for obtaining one discharge in the
past, at least for requesting or needing another discharge too soon
thereafter. Moreover, since its creation, the six-year bar has been
included in statutory sections' 5 that list various bars to discharge
involving "some form and degree of dishonesty."' 16 The legislative
and judicial mind, apparently focused on a vision of especially abusive
or fraudulent reapplications, seems to have settled on an irrebuttable
presumption that all reapplication is itself misconduct. A close examination of the present Bankruptcy Code reveals that this attitude
also underlies the recent alterations of the bar.
II. THE SIX-YEAR BAR UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

A. Operation of the Statute
The new Bankruptcy Code's treatment of the six-year bar is
complex 17 and the case law confused, but both rest on a moralistic
187 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D. Cal. ig6o); In re Thompson, 51 F. Supp. 12, 13 (W.D. Va. 1943).
The Ninth Circuit focused so exclusively on a fear of literally habitual bankrupts that it allowed
an extension within six years after a liquidation on the ground that "[iln the view of Congress,
then, such an extension is not a habit-forming event of the kind which the six year interval
requirement is intended to proscribe." Mayorga, 355 F.2d at 9o. But Justice Clark's opinion
in Perry, 383 U.S. at 399, inaccurately paraphrases the I9o2 House Report, H.R. REP. No.
1698, 57 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1902). The evil cited in the report was not habitual bankrupts,
but rather professional ones - those who accepted credit fully intending to escape their debts,
not those who had unintentionally fallen into a habit of entering bankruptcy.
13 See 35 CONG. REC. 6947 (192o) (remarks of Rep. Clayton).
14 See, e.g., Prudential Loan & Fin. Co. v. Robarts, 52 F.2d 918, 919 (5th Cir. 1931).
Is See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982); Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 85o (1938)
(repealed 1978).
16 H.R. REP. No. 1502, 9ist Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
17 The current chapter proceedings are more complex than those available in i9o3, although
they are considerably simpler than the proceedings under the Chandler Act. Chapter 7 governs
liquidation proceedings, which are largely unaltered from the old Act; it provides for the
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attitude toward multiple discharge. The bar is most severe in liquidation proceedings under chapter 7: section 727(a)(8) directs the court
not to grant a discharge if the debtor has been granted a discharge in
a liquidation or chapter ii reorganization proceeding commenced
within six years before the filing of the instant proceeding. 18 The
House and Senate Reports indicate that this provision represents "no
change from current law with respect to straight bankruptcy." 19 Section 727(a)(9), however, relaxes the bar by providing that a prior
discharge of an individual under chapter 13 does not bar discharge
under chapter 7 if the chapter 13 plan either repaid all of the individual's debts or both repaid at least seventy percent of allowed
unsecured claims and represented the debtor's "best effort." 20
Under the present chapter ii, the bar is, for the first time, applicable to reorganizations, albeit in a limited way. 2 1 When a debtor
"would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of this title if the
case were a case under chapter 7 of this title," 22 section I14i(d)(3)
prevents the debtor from obtaining discharge under a plan of reorliquidation by the court of all of the debtor's nonexempt property, the distribution to creditors
of the proceeds, and the discharge of dischargeable debts. Chapter ii governs all reorganizations
and thus replaces old chapters X, XI, and XII and § 77; it provides for the reorganization of
a debtor's capital structure and discharge under a plan developed with the participation of the
debtor, creditors, trustee, and bankruptcy court. Chapter 13 governs repayment plans for
individuals with regular income, as did the old chapter XIII for the narrower class of wage
earners, and it provides for the development of a more flexible plan by debtor, trustee, and
bankruptcy court for repayment out of future income and discharge of debts without liquidation
of property.
18 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (1982). The provision directs that discharge be granted unless "the
debtor has been granted a discharge under this section, under section 1141 of this title, or under
section 14, 371 or 476 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced within six years before the
filing of the petition." Id.
19 S. REP. No. 989, 9 5 th Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1978) (hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT];
H.R. REP. No. 595, 9 5 th Cong., 1st Sess. 385 (x977) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
The quoted language presumably means that a prior liquidation will continue to give rise to a
bar, not that discharge under chapter 7 will still be barred by precisely the same events as
before, for the provision, does make one change in the law: a discharge in a reorganization will
bar a later liquidation discharge under the new Code. Under the old law, discharge in a
corporate reorganization would not give rise to a bar, because, as the legislative history of the
Chandler Act explained, "it is not believed that public policy requires [such a] provision." H.R.
REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., ist Sess. 29 (i937).
20 1, U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (1982). This section repeals the 1938 amendment of the bar, which
provided that any wage-earner plan that failed to repay all debts would give rise to a bar. See
supra note i.
21 Chapter X of the Chandler Act contained no provision analogous to § 656(a)(3) of chapter

XIIA, Chandler Act, ch. 575, § i, 52 Stat. 840, 935 (1938) (repealed 1978), which in vague
terms made the bars to discharge applicable to a later chapter XIII plan. Chapter XI did
contain such a provision in § 366(3), Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 897 (1938)
(repealed 1978), but there are no reported cases reading the six-year bar in particular into
chapter XI. Apparently, the "public policy" directing that a reorganization should not give rise
to a bar, see supra note ig, also directed that reorganizations should not be barred.
22 1, U.S.C. § I141(d)(3) (1982).
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ganization that provides for the liquidation of its assets and termination of its business. Insofar as it affects corporations, this provision,
like section 727(a)(I), is apparently designed to discourage "trafficking
in corporate shells, a form of bankruptcy fraud."' 23 With regard to
individuals, the apparent purpose of the section is to prevent debtors
from filing in chapter ii simply to avoid the restrictions on discharge
applicable in liquidation proceedings. 24 Whether the debtor is a corporation or an individual, a reorganization in which the debtor neither
remains in business nor preserves his property is essentially a "disguised" liquidation proceeding and hence serves neither of the basic
goals of chapter ii - preserving assets and keeping companies in
business. 25 Thus, the "public policy" that Congress offered in 1937
to justify its decision not to apply the bar to reorganizations in
general 26 cannot justify exempting from the bar certain specific reorganizations that do not serve that policy.
Finally, the six-year bar has been entirely omitted from the express
provisions of chapter 13, which makes repayment plans available to
insolvent individuals with regular income. 27 The special treatment of
individual repayment plans seems a product of Congress' articulated
28
desire to favor such plans over liquidations.
The operation of all these provisions is complex. If a "good"
chapter 13 plan is defined as one that satisfies the strictures of section
727(a)(9) (one that repays all debts, or that repays at least seventy
percent and is a "best effort") and a "bad" chapter 13 plan as one
that does not, and if a "bad" chapter ii plan is defined as one that
violates section I 14I(d)(3) (one in which a debtor who would be barred
under chapter 7 attempts to liquidate and go out of business) and a
"good" plan as one that does not, then the operation of the bar can
be schematized as in the Table on the following page.
23 SENATE REPORT, supra note i9,at 7. If a liquidated, out-of-business corporation wants
to discharge its debts, it can simply dissolve. See In re Federal Insulation Dev. Corp., 14
Bankr. 362, 364 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio ig8i); Diego v. Zamost, 7 Bankr. 859, 861-62 (Bankr. S.D.

Cal. 198o); D.

STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, AND REFORM 118

(197i) (report commissioned by Brookings Institution) [hereinafter cited as BROOKINGS REPORT].
Thus, in the congressional analysis, there is no need to grant a discharge to a bankrupt shell,
but there is a good reason to deny one: an undissolved shell could be used to shield a corporation
and stockholders from liability in bankruptcy. For this reason, § 727(a)(i) forbids the grant of
a discharge in liquidation to any debtor that is not an individual, and § I41(d)(3) extends that
bar to reorganizations involving empty corporate forms. But see infra p. 769.
24 Congress clearly contemplated that, because of the expense of seeking reorganization,
Chapter ix would provide a haven primarily for businesses, but that individuals could apply
as well. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note ig, at 6.

2SSee id. at 220.
26 See supra notes Ig & 21.
27 See ii U.S.C. § 1328 (1982) (governing the granting of discharges in chapter I3). Some

courts have, however, found a form of the bar implicit in the provisions of chapter
infra p. 768.
28 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 118.
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SECOND PLAN
"bad"
"good")
chapter 11
chapter 13

chapter 7

"good"
chapter 11

barred

not barred

barred

not barred

not barred

"bad"
chapter 13

"good"
Z

chapter 11

barred

not barred

barred

not barred

not barred

P4
1-

"bad"
chapter 11

barred

not barred

barred

not barred

not barred

chapter 13

not barred

not barred

not barred

not barred

not barred

"bad"
chapter 13

barred

not barred

barred

not barred

not barred

S

"good"

B. Analysis of the Statute's Rationale
The Code's scheme for the six-year bar contains at least one clear
inconsistency: the bar operates to preclude discharge in one sequence
of chapter proceedings but not in the reverse order. Thus, a chapter
7 discharge or a "disguised 7" (that is, a "bad" chapter ii) discharge
will not bar a later "good" chapter ii discharge, but a "good" chapter
ii discharge will bar a later discharge in chapter 7, real or "disguised."

Similarly, a discharge in chapter 7, real or "disguised," will not bar
a later "bad" chapter 13 discharge, but a "bad" chapter 13 discharge

will bar a later discharge in chapter 7, real or "disguised."

This

asymmetry is conspicuously at odds with the historical belief that the
bar should have the same effect regardless of the sequence of pro29
ceedings.
One explanation for the inconsistency is found in the Code's legislative history, which insists that the six-year bar should not preclude
confirmation of a plan under chapters ii or 13, even though either
would bar discharge under chapter 7,30 because "'[i]f the debtor wants
to pay his debts pursuant to a plan, and if the creditors are willing
29 This idea was early suggested by Judge Augustus Hand in In re Kornbluth, 65 F.2d 400,
which held that an earlier composition would bar a later discharge in
liquidation. Judge Hand disagreed with In re Goldberg, 53 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 193), insofar
as that decision, which found no bar in the opposite sequence of proceedings, "implies that
confirmation of a composition is not a discharge within the meaning" of the six-year bar.
Kornbluth, 65 F.2d at 403. Similarly, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that the
"principle" behind the bar is presumably the same regardless whether an extension plan precedes
or follows a discharge in liquidation. Barnes v. Maley, 360 F.2d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 1966); In
re Mayorga, 355 F.2d 89, 91 (9 th Cir. 1966). More significantly, for the 76 years before the
adoption of the new Code, the statutory operation of the bar had never depended on the
sequence of proceedings.
30 Because confirmation acts as or leads to discharge except in limited circumstances unrelated
to the bar, the restrictions on confirmation are effectively the restrictions on discharge. See ii
U.S.C. §§ I14I(d)(3), 1328(a)-(b) (1082).
402-03 (2d Cir. '933),
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to go along, he should be allowed to do so."' ' 3 1 This explanation
ignores other sections of the Code that make clear that neither chapter
ii nor chapter 13 requires that the debtor pay all of his debts 32 or
that all of his creditors agree to the plan. 3 3 But even if, on average,
more debts will be repaid and more creditors will agree to discharge
under a plan than in a liquidation proceeding, just why these considerations indicate that a plan should bar a later liquidation but should
not be barred by an earlier one is itself an initially murky question.
Because the same amount of debt will be repaid regardless of the
order of proceedings, the crucial factor must be creditor approval
rather than debt repayment. Under the analysis of the legislative
history, when reorganization or individual repayment proceedings follow a liquidation, the creditors agree, despite full knowledge of the
debtor's earlier discharge, to release him from his debts. When, on
the other hand, liquidation follows a plan, there is no such creditor
approval: the court, not the creditor, is responsible for releasing the
debtor in a liquidation proceeding.
The only conceivable explanation for the importance of creditor
approval is that the bar reflects a moral judgment about repeating
bankrupts. If the bar were not based on the notion that "recurrent
avoidance of debt" is misconduct, the creditors' forgiveness would be
irrelevant. Given that, under the Code, the right to approve or
disapprove discharge under chapters ii and i3 is not restricted to
creditors who have been disappointed once before, the evil in unapproved discharge in chapter 7 cannot be that the same creditors are
twice spurned. Nor can the evil in the discharge be its effect on the
economy: if discharge really does harm the economy, the damage is
not limited to creditors, and the consent of the creditors alone should
therefore not carry decisive weight.
The creditors' consent can thus be of crucial importance only if
the evil is in the debtor's own failure to live up to standards of honesty,
competence, or success. Civil misconduct frequently has not only a
general victim - society - but a specific one as well. If the specific
victim declines to press charges or level accusation, the state must
also extend forgiveness. By the same token, if the choice repeatedly
to "escape" debts is a form of misconduct with a specific victim the creditor who should not be forced to bear the consequences of
someone else's failing - then the victim's consent transforms what
31 HOUSE REPORT, supra note I9, at 129 (quoting I REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 175 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT]).
32 See II U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(I), 1322(b)(2) (1982).
33 See id. §§ I129(b)(i), 1325(a)(5). Indeed, in chapter 13, a vote of unsecured creditors on
the plan is not a requirement of confirmation at all. See id. § 1325.
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the law would otherwise34 see as conduct to be prohibited into an act
that is at worst neutral.
Thus, Congress did not believe the six-year bar to be a morally
neutral general restraint on discharge. Nor did it believe the bar's
purpose to be a moralistic restraint of fraudulent conduct alone. Before the enactment of the new Code, the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States proposed legislation that would have retained the bar only in liquidation proceedings, reduced the six-year
period to five years, and provided for hardship exceptions, "as in cases
where a debtor has been victimized by a disabling and expensive
illness within the bar period."' 35 In refusing to enact these proposals,
and in making "no change" 3 6 in the existing law, Congress implicitly
reaffirmed its intention to apply the bar to all repeaters, not just
fraudulent ones. The Code, it seems clear, reflects a belief that all
multiple discharge is blameworthy.
The same attitude is implicit in the other apparent reason for the
inapplicability of the traditional bars to discharge in chapter I3 proceedings: Congress' desire to encourage the debtor to file under chapter
13 rather than chapter 7. 37 The legislative history offers two explanations for this preference for chapter 13. First, the "benefit to creditors is self-evident: their losses will be significantly less than if the
debtors opt for straight bankruptcy."3 8s Second, most consumers
"would rather work out a repayment plan than opt for straight bankruptcy,"' 39 because such a plan preserves their nonexempt assets and
40
leaves their reputations less damaged.
Regarding the first rationale, although creditors' losses may generally be lower under chapter 13 than under chapter 7, liberalizing
the availability of discharge seems an implausible or at least inefficient
way to promote debt repayment. 4 1 The more likely explanation for
34 On the other hand, although the creditors' approval of a "bad" chapter ii plan that is
filed to discharge a corporate shell used in bankruptcy fraud may transform that particular plan
into a neutral act, in the congressional analysis it fails more generally to discourage the perpetration of such fraud, the goal of § 1141(d)(3). Congress thus imposed an absolute bar in that
provision. For similar reasons, it is possible that creditor consent does not always wholly forgive
misconduct by individuals in repeated discharge. See infra note 79. Nevertheless, Congress
must have considered multiple discharge to be misconduct, given that it believed such conduct
needed forgiveness.
3S I COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 11-12.
36 SENATE REPORT, supra note ig, at 99; HousE REPORT, supra note 19, at 385.
37 See HousE REPORT, supra note i9, at 117-18.
38 Id. at 118.
39 Id. at 117 (citation omitted).
40 Id. at i18.
41 Repeal of the bar would produce greater repayment only if it would lead some debtors to
fie under chapter 13 rather than chapter 7, and only if, as Congress believed, wage errner
plans would repay more than liquidations and the total creditor gains thus produced would
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the omission of the bar from chapter

13

is that consumers prefer

repayment plans to liquidations. Of course, some debtors -

those

who either have no regular source of income or do not want to be

subject to the dictates of a plan for a number of years -

would likely

prefer to file for liquidation, but are unable to do so because the Code

makes available only one fresh start every six years. For two apparent
reasons, however, consumer debtors who want to work out a plan

are given special consideration. First, their desires dovetail with the
prediction of greater creditor recovery under chapter i3. Second, the

perceived good character of these debtors seems particularly important
to the legislative mind.
As the legislative history demonstrates in some detail, the contemplated beneficiaries of congressional largesse under chapter 13 were
responsible consumers overburdened with debt and unable to save for
such financial crises as serious illness or loss of employment. 42 The
concern for honest but unfortunate debtors is familiar: these are ap-

parently the same people that the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws
had in mind when it recommended a hardship exception to the bar,

and that the bar's opponents in the 1902 floor debates pointed to as
43
undeserving victims of the bar.

If the purpose of the bar were simply to prevent recurrent avoidance of debts without moralistic considerations of the debtor's behavior, "responsible" debtors would presumably be no more exempt from
the bar's operation than would any other repeat applicants. But given

that the bar aims to control misconduct in the form of repeated
discharge, its repeal in chapter 13 is comprehensible. Because of the
special merit of chapter 13 debtors, the extenuating circumstances
they face, and the fact that alternative to discharge for them would

be subjection to "[h]arsh collection practices," ' 44 such debtors are forexceed whatever creditor gains might be realized by maintaining the bar. This possibility seems
unlikely. Even if the bar were still in place under chapter 13, debtors with a past discharge in
liquidation would probably still choose to file under that chapter because in contrast to chapter
7 - which would also deny discharge but would offer only the court's assistance in distributing
the debtor's nonexempt property - chapter 13 would at least offer an extension of time to
repay. Repeal will prompt debtors without a past discharge to file under chapter 13 only if
they are aware of the repeal, are concerned that they may need another discharge within six
years, and despite the fact that even a liquidation will not bar a later discharge in an individual
repayment plan, prefer chapter 13 because a "good" plan will not bar a later discharge in
liquidation. Although Congress might have reasoned thus, the underlying assumptions seem
very tenuous. More likely, Congress simply never considered the specific effect that repealing
the bar might have on incentives to file.
42

In many cases, a young family of two, both working, incur a large amount of debt.
If the wife stops working because of pregnancy, the family loses nearly half of its income,
and has an extra member to feed and shelter. The family will go deeper and deeper into
debt to support themselves until finally the roof falls in.
HousE REPoRT, supra note ig, at 116.

43See supra p. 761.
44HouSE REPORT, supra note x9, at 116.
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given what would otherwise be reprehensible. Conversely, the Code
suggests that debtors likely to file under chapter 7 lack redeeming
merit because they simply want to escape their honest debts - because
they are closer to being "deadbeats."
Most of the case law construing the current version of the six-year
bar is similarly based on the perception that the bar's purpose is to
control misconduct in the form of individual redischarge. This perception is evidenced by the fact that a number of bankruptcy courts
have decided to read some modified version of the six-year bar into
section 1325(a)(3)'s requirement that all chapter 13 plans be proposed
in good faith. 45 Likewise, two circuit courts have held that to be in
good faith, a plan must not be an abuse of the spirit or purpose of
chapter 13, and that the nondischargeability of a debt under chapter
7 is one relevant factor in the equitable analysis of whether a plan
constitutes "abuse."' 46 Another circuit has held that a relevant consideration in the good-faith calculus is "the frequency with which the
debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Reform Act and its
predecessors." ' 47 Moreover, a number of lower courts have specifically
held that nondischargeability in chapter 7 on the ground of the six48
year bar may preclude confirmation of a minimal repayment plan.
These cases have revived the moralistic viewpoint of the old law: they
refuse full forgiveness to individuals seeking repeated discharge under
49
any chapter.
The bar's inapplicability to corporations reflects the same moralistic attitude. Under both statute and case law, the bar censures only
individual misconduct in multiple discharge; pursuant to section
114i(d)(3), a corporation may obtain repeated discharge unless it goes
out of business and liquidates its assets. Even if the corporation goes
out of business, its dissolution will guarantee for it effective relief from
45 1i U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982).
46 See Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982).
47 Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885, 889 (Ixth Cir. 1983).
48 See In re Hurd, 4 Bankr. 55x, 56o (Bankr. W.D. Mich. x98o); In re Chaffin, 4 Bankr.
324, 326 (Bankr. D. Kan. i98o); In re Cook, 3 Bankr. 480, 486 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 198o); In
re Bloom, 3 Bankr. 467, 471-72 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. i98o).
49 In one sense, however, these cases are also revolutionary, because a long, authoritative,
contrary line of opinions has established that the right to a discharge is statutory and therefore
must be construed strictly in favor of the debtor. See Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562
(1915); Bank of Pa. v. Adlman, 54z F.2d 999, 1003 (2d Cir. 1976); Friendly Fin. Discount
Corp. v. Jones, 49o F.2d 452, 456 (Sth Cir. 1974); In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 99o, 997 (2d Cir.),
aff'd sub nom. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1973); In re Tabibian, 289 F.2d 793, 795
(2d Cir. i96i); In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 9o3, 905 (3d Cir. 1956). Consistent with this tradition,
one court has recently held that § 1325(a)(3) should not be read to include any form of the bar
as a condition to discharge, In re Ciotta, 4 Bankr. 253, 255-56 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. i98o), and
another has held that a prior discharge can constitute grounds for a denial of discharge only in
a truly "extraordinary circumstance," GFC Corp. v. Bixby, io Bankr. 456, 459 (Bankr. D.
Kan. I98I) (emphasis omitted).
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all its debts. 5 0 Moreover, in construing sections 727(a) and 114i(d)(3),

several courts have held that the concept of nondischargeability is
entirely inapplicable to corporate reorganizations. These courts have
interpreted section 727(a)(i) to provide that the restrictions of section

727(a) do not apply at all to debtors other than individuals in liquidation, 5 ' rather than that debtors other than individuals are specifically barred from chapter 7 discharge under all circumstances 5 2 and
from chapter ii discharge under the circumstances listed in section
I141(d)(3). 5 3 Thus, a corporation can obtain repeated discharge in
chapter ii without restriction and without dissolving. By contrast,
lower courts have subjected individuals to some form of the bar not
only in chapter 7 proceedings, but also in chapter 13 proceedings,
despite the noticeable absence of any express statutory authority for
the bar in the latter.
Taken together, the individual and corporate cases thus reexpress
the attitude of the old Bankruptcy Act - an attitude even more
moralistic than that of the present statute. All repeating individuals
have committed5 4 a guilty act, but because of the totemic appeal to
"public policy," either the concept of misconduct is inapplicable to
corporations or corporate culpability is offset by the importance to the
economy of corporate rejuvenation.
C. Substantive Analysis
The bar, as it currently exists under statute and case law, is
crucially flawed: it is an arbitrary measure that serves only crudely
its policy ends. This arbitrariness is apparent in the bar's function as
a "bright line." Debtors a few weeks on one side of the line can
receive a new discharge; debtors a few weeks on the other cannot.
The original defense for the use of any discharge-limiting line and for
this line in particular remains the only defense: the line is the average
of suggestions received over eight decades ago 55 in response to a letter
survey of "leading lawyers, judges, and business houses," 56 which
was prompted by a contemporary scandal involving a rash of fraudulent bankruptcies.5 7 Because bankruptcy cases typically involve inSOSee

supra note 23.

S' See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Airlift Int'l, Inc., 16 Bankr. 639, 640 (Bankr.

S.D. Fla. ig8i); Delco Dev. Co. v. Kuempel Co., 14 Bankr. 324, 327 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
52 The legislative history is explicit: "A change from current law will prevent corporations

from being discharged in liquidation cases." SENATE REPORT, supra note z9, at 7.
53 See supra pp. 762-63.
S4 See supra note 19.

See 35 CONG. REc. 6942 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Ray).
S6Id. at 6939.
S7 The original authors of the bar drafted it as an absolute line only because "present policy"
at the time, based on a feared "scandal" about abusive bankrupts, favored "a rigid time limit"
Ss

over discretion. REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY CONCERNING PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
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dividuals or corporations hovering on the brink of catastrophe, the
bright line's arbitrariness seems especially severe, and the defense of
58
the six-year line especially feeble.
A second element of arbitrariness - and the bar's most significant
flaw - is the bar's overbreadth relative to its purpose.5 9 The real
rationale for the bar has always been the prevention of misconduct
by individuals, but for eighty years Congress has failed to articulate
precisely why "it is quite clear" 60 that every request for discharge
within six years of a prior request is misconduct. Indeed, by recently
removing the bar from chapter 13, Congress has tacitly acknowledged
that there may be cases in which two or more discharges within six
years are not too many. And the attention paid to the class of professional or habitual bankrupts suggests that the bar is really designed
to curb the activities of only a few abusive repeaters.
OF 1898, at I8 (igoo). In light of the lack of empirical evidence of such a threat today, see
infra note 59, the rather dramatic blanket measure seems excessive if intended only as an
especially certain way to prevent fraud.
58 This arbitrariness is well illustrated by an incident on the floor of the House in 1926.
When asked why his committee did not make the period 20 years instead of six, Congressman
Michener of Michigan replied with commendable accuracy: "Because we made it six." 67 CONG.
REC. 7676 (1926) (remarks of Rep. Michener). (For comparison, Deuteronomy, with apparently
equal arbitrariness, commands creditors to release all debts once every seven years. See Deuteronomy 15:I-:3.)
59The relevant empirical studies, few and limited as they are, suggest that the need for any
bar based on censurable past discharge, however defined, is not pressing, because multiple
discharge in general has never been an acute problem. The most recent such study is the
Brookings Institution's comprehensive review of the operation of bankruptcy. See BROOKINGS
REPORT, supra note 23, at I. Only three percent of the liquidation cases studied involved earlier
state or federal insolvency proceedings. Id. at 59. Although this figure might be artificially
deflated by the voluntary choice of debtors not to reapply within six years because of their
knowledge that a creditor could object to discharge, the deflation is probably negligible, because
even when creditors could object to discharge, they rarely bother to do so. Id. at 9o--9. Of
the chapter XIII cases, fully 23% involved repeaters, but this statistic was skewed by a
fantastically high proportion of repeaters - about two-thirds of all those filing - in Birmingham, Alabama, one of the few areas in the country where bankruptcy judges made chapter
XIII relief easily available. Id. at lO4. On the other hand, a much larger percentage of
repeaters than of first-time filers completed payments under their plans; apparently, previous
bankruptcy had taught them how to handle their finances when they again became subject to
a plan. Id. at 104-05. Among business bankrupts, "recidivism" was rarer - occurring in only
about one percent of the cases studied, id. at 114 - but this figure may be skewed for purposes
of comparison to individual bankruptcies, because two-thirds of the already unhealthy businesses
that had filed under chapter XI ceased operations within two years, id. at 11S, and if they had
stayed open, such businesses might have been repeaters many times over.
As early as 1936, then-Professor William 0. Douglas reported similar statistics after a
prolonged study by a combined academic and governmental team during the bankruptcy-ridden
Great Depression. Douglas, Some FunctionalAspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329 (1932).
Although the investigation surveyed hundreds of cases in Boston and New Jersey, Douglas
found only eight cases in which the six-year bar would have prohibited discharge had the
creditors objected, and only 118 cases - 3.3% of the New Jersey cases and io.8% of the Boston
cases - that involved any repetition. Id. at 353-54.
6035 CONG. REc. 6940 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Ray); see supra p. 760.
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The root of the confusion is the ambivalence or even disingenuousness with which the courts and Congress have approached the
task of justifying the bar. The sole defense of the new bar is that it
represents "no change" from old law. 6 1 In historical context, this
defense contains its own refutation: eighty years after the introduction
of the bar, in an age of pervasive welfare legislation, no one has
openly asserted that every recurrently insolvent debtor struggling
against a turbulent economy has committed a blameworthy act. Yet
this unarticulated belief has exercised a very considerable sway over
the minds of judges and legislators in recent years.
The bar therefore remains intact under chapter 7 - still for reasons that appear dubious in light of the overall goals of bankruptcy
law. If the "fresh start" policy underlying chapter 7 favors restoring
a debtor to productivity by freeing him from oppressive debt, 62 the

same policy calls for such a result even after an earlier discharge.
Although it is true that a repeating bankrupt's record may suggest
that his first fresh start did not in fact restore him to full productivity,
his discharge may still have raised his productivity somewhat, and
individual circumstances may suggest that another fresh start might
help even more. On the other hand, even if the breadth of the bar
in chapter 7 is not reduced, the present Code does offer some relief
to a debtor who has received a prior discharge in liquidation: he can
still file under chapter 13. Indeed, the discipline of a plan may
recommend itself to the consumer with a history of bankruptcy. The
chapter 13 option, however, does not go far enough, for it is available
only to debtors with regular income of some form. 63 Moreover, a
repayment plan will probably prove unattractive and unhelpful to a
debtor who resents the imposition of such a plan and wants instead
a genuine "fresh start." If there is an independent reason for making
chapter 7 available at all as an alternative to chapter 13, that reason,
for at least some applicants, should remain even after an initial discharge.

64

I. A PROPOSAL
The apparent remedy for the flaws in the six-year bar is a more
flexible provision that would allow a court, in individual cases, sensitively to apply a bar based on misconduct evident in a history of
discharge. Application would not involve a bright line; rather, the
court could consider the particular facts of the case in deciding
61 See supra p. 762.

62 See, e.g., Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554 (i915).
63 See ix U.S.C. §

Io9(e) (1982).

64 Although two recently introduced bills would further encourage the use of chapter 13
rather than chapter 7, neither would deny all independent justification for an initial liquidation.
See S. 1013, 98th Cong., ist Sess. § 503 (1983); H.R. 4786, 9 7th Cong., ist Sess. § 2 (1981).
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whether to deny or grant a discharge to a debtor who had previously
received one. Further, the new measure would allow the court to
discriminate between particularly malfeasant debtors and the more
meritorious ones who can and should still be helped by the "fresh
65
start" policy of liquidation.
Similarly discretionary provisions that exist in other areas of bankruptcy law could provide a model for a reformulated bar. The Bankruptcy Commission's 1973 report proposed a "hardship" exception to
the bar in liquidation proceedings. 66 Section 1325(a)(3), as interpreted
by the courts, already directs consideration of prior discharge as one
factor in a good-faith analysis. 67 And in England, a prior discharge
has for decades been a statutory "fact"' 68 that must inform the judge's
sweeping discretion to deny discharge or to grant it and then to mold
its exact form.69
Two obstacles stand in the way of the passage and effective application of such a flexible provision. First, the specter of abuse of
discharge that haunted the legislative mind in 1978 presumably still
exists.70 To respond to that concern, the new provision should be
drafted to forbid abuse. The task of drafting, however, raises the
second and crucial obstacle: the history of the bar suggests no consensus on exactly what constitutes abuse, and unless Congress can generate a clearer rationale for the bar than the conflicting and conclusory
assertions of the past, the courts will either be left in confusion 71 or
65 In his report on bankruptcy during the 1930's, see supra note 59, William 0. Douglas
reached a similar conclusion. Of all the cases of repeaters in bankruptcy that he studied, only
25% involved instances of fraud, speculation, gambling, or gross extravagance. Another xx%

involved misfortune. Of the remainder, Douglas wrote: "T]hese cases involve apparently honest
persons fighting a losing battle against a militant economic order." Douglas, supra note 59, at
358. He concluded that the availability of discharge should depend on the type of economic
failure in each case, not on whether the application falls on the nether side of a magical sixyear line. Id. at 36O-6L.
66 See supra p. 766.
67 Although these cases are probably wrongly decided as interpretations of the present statute,
see infra note 71, they are nonetheless examples of a flexible bar based on a history of discharge,
albeit a bar that is applied without the benefit of a clear legislative purpose. See infra pp. 7727368 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 26(3)(k).
69 See Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 84, 90-91 (1982).
70 Repeated use of chapter 7 might, in fact, present a greater potential for abuse than would
use of chapter 13, because chapter 7 limits the debtor's liability to the value of his nonexempt
property, whereas § 1325(a)(4) forbids confirmation unless the unsecured creditors would receive
at least as much as they would in liquidation. On the other hand, in the vast majority of cases,
the unsecured creditors of a chapter 13 debtor would receive nothing in chapter 7, because the
chapter 13 debtor has no unencumbered nonexempt assets; as a result, § 1325(a)(4) offers little
additional protection to creditors.
71 The cases described earlier construing § 1325(a)(3), the flexible "good faith" provision for
wage earner plans, see supra p. 768, illustrate well the dangers of confusion involved in replacing
the six-year bar with a new flexible provision. Virtually all of the circuit courts have held that
a plan is filed in good faith if it serves the "spirit and purpose" of chapter 13, see Kitchens v.

1984]

SIX-YEAR BAR

be allowed unbridled discretion. 72 Cultural values will supply little
guidance. Our courts are unaccustomed to the direct application of
whatever cultural values relating to multiple discharge may exist, and
those values have in the past been informed by the absolute command
of the six-year bar itself. 73 If Congress and the courts have for decades
been unable to enunciate a clear justification for the bar, there is little
reason to expect the courts to be able to do so now.
The dangers of flexibility, however, must be evaluated in light of
the alternatives. The current general hostility to multiple discharge
makes an overly expansive interpretation of the new provision unlikely. 74 At worst, therefore, unfair or confused application of the
Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 702 F.2d 885, 888 (1ith Cir. 1983); Memphis Bank & Trust
Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431-32 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Estus, 695 F.2d 311,
316 (8th Cir. z982); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4 th Cir. 1982); Ravenot v. Rimgale,
669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1982); Tenney v. Terry, 63o F.2d 634, 635 n.3 (8th Cir. ig8o) (per
curiam), but discovering that spirit has proved unusually difficult for the bankruptcy courts.
The section has been among the most litigated provisions in the Code, and judges themselves
are apparently unable fully to comprehend the purpose of chapter 13's unprecedented liberality.
See Van Baalen, Bankruptcy Code Chapter 13 - What Price the "BetterDischarge"?, 35 OLa..
L. REV. 455, 459, 466-71 (1982).
More specifically, the courts have diverged on the role that a prior discharge should play in
an analysis of good faith. The majority view, that a discharge is a relevant factor, is most
likely wrong in light of the House Report's assertion that the creditor consent provision eliminates
the need for the old bars to discharge in chapter 13. See supra p. 765. The consideration of
prior discharges in good-faith analyses has largely been justified by the claim that a debtor
should not be able to obtain multiple liquidation-like discharges simply by filing under chapter
13. See supra p. 768. But the courts, lacking congressional guidance in the matter, have failed
to analyze how the bar serves the spirit of chapter 7 and how that rationale also jusifies the
bar's importation into chapter 13.
72 The cases construing § 1 4i(d)(3) illustrate well the dangers of allowing the courts complete
discretion. The command of that section is absolute: no liquidated, out-of-business debtor shall
be granted a discharge that would be barred under chapter 7. Some courts have ignored this
express provision by holding that the bars to discharge in § 727 are entirely inapplicable to
corporations. See supra p. 769. By contrast, courts have never ignored the express terms of
the six-year bar as applied to individuals. In the same way, although the courts have now
found a form of the bar in § 1325(a)(3) despite its express exclusion therefrom, see supra p. 768,
they have never considered reading a similar bar into chapter ii's good-faith provisions,
88 1112(b) and 1129(a)(3). (There are as yet no recorded opinions holding that a history of
corporate discharge unmarked by actual fraud might be a relevant factor under §§ iIi2(b) or
1129(a)(3). See In re Colony Square Co., 22 Bankr. 92 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982); see also In re
Stahl, Asano, Shigetomi Assocs., 6 Bankr. 232 (Bankr. D. Hawaii i98o) (likely success on merits
of pending appeal one factor in deciding whether to grant stay); cf. In re Sung Hi Lim, 7 Bankr.
316 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 298O) (finding that actual fraud in past proceedings established lack of
good faith)). If Congress in fact wishes to limit corporate redischarge, see infra note 79, it will
have to say so, and not simply depend on the courts' undirected discretion to discern the "spirit"
of chapter ii. In chapters 7 and 13, the greatest danger in discretion is probably the potential
for hidden social or racial biases in the granting of discharges, but this potential resides in any
provision authorizing judicial discretion, and such biases have at least been less apparent than
the one in favor of corporations.
73 Courts have, for example, defended importation of the bar into chapter 13 only by analogy
to chapter 7 and not by analysis of the purpose of the bar itself. See supra p. 768.
74 The more realistic danger is that courts might be too restrictive and deny meritorious
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new bar might fail to allow a discharge to all the deserving debtors
who would currently be denied one. Under chapter 13, the alternatives to a new rule are a return to an absolute bar with the same
flaws as those of the chapter 7 bar or continued uncertainty about the
vitality of the bar under section 1325(a)(3).
Moreover, objections to open-ended provisions are less at home in
bankruptcy than in other areas of the law. Almost by definition, a
"fresh start" is a wild card in the present economic system, a game
still played largely according to the rules of the will theory of binding
contracts. As long as bankruptcy remains an equitable concept padding the stringency of legalism, open-ended provisions will probably
be an indispensable component of bankruptcy law.7 5 Indeed, as noted
above, 76 flexible provisions that specifically allow courts to deny discharge on the basis of past bankruptcies are already familiar.
Finally, the discretion of the courts could at least be cabined if
Congress clarified the rationale for the bar. The cures for the dangers
of a flexible bar and for the flaws in the present rigid one are thus
the same: to limit discretion and to make the bar sensitive to its policy
ends, Congress must deliver a clear and definitive statement of the
real rationale behind the bar. For these purposes, past legislative and
judicial expressions are simply inadequate. The image of a class of
abusers cannot justify a blanket bar; Congress must either confess
hostility toward all repeaters, narrow the operation of the provision,
or justify the bar on some clear ground other than just the prevention
77
of misconduct.
A new statement of the bar's rationale should include several
elements. To some extent, such a statement of purpose will necessarily
entail a fresh look at the functions of the individual chapters of the
Bankruptcy Code. If the bar is to serve the spirit of each chapter,
Congress must assess the significance of a record of failures in light
of that spirit. As then-Professor William 0. Douglas observed in 1936,
the problem of distinguishing meritorious from nonmeritorious applicants "is not peculiar to cases of 'repeaters.' It is made perhaps only

applications filed well over six years after the prior discharge. For this reason, the Commission's
suggestion has much to recommend it: above five years, the discharge is of right, but below
that period, it is subject to individual analysis. See supra p. 766.
75 In England, discharge is almost entirely a matter of discretion. See supra p. 772.
American bankruptcy law, too, contains many open-ended provisions. See, e.g., xi U.S.C.
§§ 105, 305, 362(d)(I), 523(a)(8)(B), 552(b), iix2(b), 1129(a)(3), 1325(a)(3) (1982).
76 See supra p. 772.
77 In 1978, when it had an ideal opportunity to do so, Congress did nothing to define the
purpose of the bar: the Bankruptcy Code retained the bar in chapter 7 with "no change," see
supra p. 762, excluded it from chapters ix and 13 only through an indiscriminate exclusion of
a number of bars to discharge, see supra p. 765, and added it in a modified form to "disguised
7's" through a similarly indiscriminate inclusion of a number of bars to discharge, see supra p.
762-63.
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somewhat more acute in such cases. 7 8s Part of the confusion over
the significance of the bar is hence only an aspect of the current
79
confusion over the purpose of the individual chapters themselves.
The very fact of repeated discharge, however, does raise certain
concerns not appropriate to cases involving first-time applicants, because the multiplication of discharges may constitute evidence of misconduct in financial matters. First, repetition of applications lends at
least some credibility to a claim that the applicant's overextension was
fraudulent. But even without congressional direction, the courts can
already give this fact evidentiary consideration under section
1325(a)(3), and they could do so under any provision drafted explicitly

to bar bad faith in particular in chapter 7 filings. Thus, to the extent
that the six-year bar is intended to curb fraud, its purpose would be
better served by a more general good-faith provision, although a
flexible bar could also be used to serve this goal.
Second, the need for repeated discharge may also constitute evidence of nonfraudulent misconduct in financial matters - evidence
that the applicant has fallen below a minimally acceptable level of
financial responsibility or moderation.80 On reapplication, but not
before, distinguishing good discharges from bad discharges may necessitate close scrutiny. This need has been the central rationale for
the bar from its inception, and since 1898 Congress has asserted that
bankruptcy should not be "framed for . . .scoundrels." 8' Any new
statement of purpose must announce without disingenuousness that
78 Douglas, supra note 59, at 360.

79 Applying to the individual chapters both the concept of misconduct in multiple discharge

and the new flexible bar would itself be a complex task. Thus, one function of the congressional
statement of the bar's purpose in chapters ii and 13 would be to clarify the real significance of
creditor consent to multiple discharge.. Because the present consent provisions do not guarantee
full creditor agreement, especially in chapter 13, see supra p. 765, and because limited consent
may not totally transform misconduct with effects on the general economy into a morally neutral
act, consent may not justify a total repeal of the bar. A more flexible measure might therefore
actually restrict the frequency of discharge allowed in chapters ii and 13 while liberalizing it
in chapter 7.
Further, a flexible bar might be extended to corporate bankruptcy. Congress has never seen
fit to explain exactly why, under the present statute, "public policy" justifies exempting from

the bar reorganizations that do not involve shell corporations. It is at least possible that
misconduct is a meaningful concept in the context of corporate activity and that the goal of
discouraging that misconduct may outweigh "public policy" in some cases.
Finally, a new flexible bar would be extended under § I1 4 i(d)(3) to "disguised 7's" -

filings

by individuals in chapter ii to escape the bars to discharge under chapter 7. The judge would
then be required to determine whether the debtor's behavior would have constituted misconduct
had the filing been in liquidation.
80In this sense, the six-year bar is a kind of acid test for attitudes toward discharge itself.

The universal availability of one discharge may be a matter of common acceptance for a variety
of reasons, but, as evidenced by the English system, see suprap. 772, the Commission's suggested
provision, see supra p. 766, and even implicitly by the six-year bar itself, see infra p. 776,

repeated discharge has been seen to require closer consideration of whether the applicant really
"deserves" relief.
81 H.R. REP. No. 65, 5 5 th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1898).
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the real purpose of the bar is the prohibition of misconduct. Thus,
the statement must also attempt a defensible definition of the misconduct that inheres in repeated discharge.
To serve the policy goals of bankruptcy law rather than to express
irrational hostility toward ex-bankrupts, a definition of misconduct
must distinguish between cases of pure misfortune, in which a second
fresh start may serve its intended goal of needed rehabilitation, and
cases of pure willful irresponsibility, in which a fresh start would only
reward conduct that can and should be discouraged. Thus, only cases
in which the primary cause of insolvency is behavior that can realistically be deterred by the threat of denial of discharge should be
labelled cases of misconduct. Somewhere in the realm of incompetence that lies between ill chance and extreme irresponsibility is the
line that Congress must discern between bankruptcies that can fairly
be said to have been avoidable and those that cannot. This line may
be susceptible of only vague definition; it is a line pressured by the
tension between the forgiving tenor of modern social relief legislation
and the more stringent, objective level of ordinary care demanded by
the common law. Yet whatever the dangers of moralistic paternalism
inherentin the search for a standard, that search is unavoidable; the
six-year bar itself sets such a standard, but it is a crude and unyielding
82
one.
Empirical evidence can be of little help in the attempts of courts
or Congress to flesh out this standard of financial good conduct,
because statistics cannot measure the merit in qualities or habits of
character that will excuse a history of incompetence. Rather, the
enterprise of defining when a request for discharge constitutes misconduct is one of normative imagination, of filling in social context
around the bare fact of repeated discharge and altering the imagined
facts to determine, on the basis of contemporary notions of what is
fairly avoidable and what is not, at what point poor fortune becomes
poor conduct. This was Congressman Ray's enterprise when he envisioned "professional bankrupts," and the Perry Court's when it
envisioned "habitual bankrupts."8 3 The flaw in the six-year bar is
not that it is a product of such images, but that it flattens the images
and applies them simplistically and rigidly instead of allowing them
to inform the discretion of the judge.
IV. CONCLUSION
The six-year bar has been justified by a variety of conflicting
82 It has been noted that the bar, as an instance of a rule of "limited" discharge, keeps a
court from paternalistically judging the lifestyle of the applicant. See Boshkoff, supra note 69,
at 73, 125. The desire to keep the court's hands clean may be bought at too great a cost the legislature's even more paternalistic and absolute prohibition of all repeated discharge within
six years, regardless of the circumstances.
83 See supra pp. 759-6o.
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rationales and has served only the most intolerant and least articulated
of them - the notion that seeking discharge too often is misconduct.
To revise the bar to serve only its justifiable policy ends, Congress
must directly consider those ends and avoid justifications colored by
visions of potential abuse. The resulting measure may well be more
flexible and therefore less certain than an absolute bar; a rule applied
with even perfect regularity, however, can be no more just than its
substance. To ensure that any new bar is both capable of regular
application and defensible on policy grounds, Congress must support
it with a coherent and consistent statement of purpose embodying a
notion of the boundary between financial misfortune and misconduct.

